Participants: Alon, Galit, Yinon, Ori
The meeting had two parts. The first was an attempt to classify some of the questions that have come up so far- with regards to mental representations. We discussed two main views- on the first the commitment to representations is in effect a commitment to some cognitive phenomena and nothing more. The second view is much stronger and is committed to the existence of actual (physical) internal representations as a part of the cognitive mechanism that underlies and enables the relevant phenomena. We tried to better understand the extent of this commitment, and what it would take to make an argument for it.
In the second part of the meeting, Ori presented a possible claim that something can only function as a reprsentation within a mechanism if there is also a cognitive agent within that mechanism that uses it as such. He claimed that if this is the case, the strong view on internal mental representations is no longer available (for it would require an "internal" cognitive agent.) Arguments for and against these claims were discussed.